Explaining Games [recurso electrónico] : The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory / by Boudewijn de Bruin.

Por: de Bruin, Boudewijn [author.]Colaborador(es): SpringerLink (Online service)Tipo de material: Texto

TextoSeries Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science ; 346Editor: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 2010Descripción: XVIII, 178 p. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9781402099069Tema(s): Philosophy (General) | Logic | Science -- Philosophy | Social sciences -- Philosophy | Mathematics | Economics, Mathematical | Philosophy | Philosophy of Science | Logic | Game Theory/Mathematical Methods | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences | Philosophy of the Social SciencesFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 501 Clasificación LoC:B67Recursos en línea: Libro electrónico Texto

Contenidos:

Preliminaries -- Preliminaries -- Epistemic Logic -- Normal Form Games -- Extensive Games -- Epistemology -- Applications of Game Theory -- The Methodology of Game Theory.

En: Springer eBooksResumen: Does game theory - the mathematical theory of strategic interaction - provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory - the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory - is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. De Bruin proves new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and he explores in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. He argues that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, De Bruin argues, has been rather successful in achieving this aim.

Existencias ( 1 )
Notas de título ( 3 )

Existencias
Tipo de ítem	Biblioteca actual	Colección	Signatura	Copia número	Estado	Fecha de vencimiento	Código de barras
Libro Electrónico	Biblioteca Electrónica	Colección de Libros Electrónicos	B67 (Browse shelf(Abre debajo))	1	No para préstamo		370724-2001

Preliminaries -- Preliminaries -- Epistemic Logic -- Normal Form Games -- Extensive Games -- Epistemology -- Applications of Game Theory -- The Methodology of Game Theory.

Does game theory - the mathematical theory of strategic interaction - provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory - the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory - is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. De Bruin proves new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and he explores in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. He argues that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, De Bruin argues, has been rather successful in achieving this aim.