Relational Supply Contracts [recurso electrónico] : Optimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements / by Michaela Isabel Höhn.

Por: Höhn, Michaela Isabel [author.]Colaborador(es): SpringerLink (Online service)Tipo de material: TextoTextoSeries Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 629Editor: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010Descripción: XVI, 124 p. 31 illus. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9783642027918Tema(s): Economics | Mathematical optimization | Economics, Mathematical | Industrial procurement | Economics/Management Science | Procurement | Operations Research/Decision Theory | Game Theory/Mathematical Methods | OptimizationFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 658.72 Clasificación LoC:HD39.5Recursos en línea: Libro electrónicoTexto
Contenidos:
Literature Review on Supply Chain Contracts -- Relational Contracts -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Quantity Flexibility -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Buy-Back Price -- QF vs. Buy-Back Contract in Buyer-Supplier Relationships -- Case Study: Supplier Relationship Management at Volkswagen Group -- Conclusion and Outlook.
En: Springer eBooksResumen: Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contracts is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.
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Colección de Libros Electrónicos HD39.5 (Browse shelf(Abre debajo)) 1 No para préstamo 373471-2001

Literature Review on Supply Chain Contracts -- Relational Contracts -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Quantity Flexibility -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Buy-Back Price -- QF vs. Buy-Back Contract in Buyer-Supplier Relationships -- Case Study: Supplier Relationship Management at Volkswagen Group -- Conclusion and Outlook.

Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contracts is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.

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