Relational Supply Contracts [recurso electrónico] : Optimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements / by Michaela Isabel Höhn.
Tipo de material: TextoSeries Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 629Editor: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010Descripción: XVI, 124 p. 31 illus. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9783642027918Tema(s): Economics | Mathematical optimization | Economics, Mathematical | Industrial procurement | Economics/Management Science | Procurement | Operations Research/Decision Theory | Game Theory/Mathematical Methods | OptimizationFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 658.72 Clasificación LoC:HD39.5Recursos en línea: Libro electrónicoTipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
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Libro Electrónico | Biblioteca Electrónica | Colección de Libros Electrónicos | HD39.5 (Browse shelf(Abre debajo)) | 1 | No para préstamo | 373471-2001 |
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HD3616 .U47 V57 1995 EB Economics of regulation and antitrust | HD38.5 Fashion supply chain management using radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies | HD38.5 .L64 2011 EB Logistics operations and management | HD39.5 Relational Supply Contracts | HD4801 -8943 EU Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement Migration | HD4801 -8943 Monopsonistic Labour Markets and the Gender Pay Gap | HD4801 -8943 The Labour Market Impact of the EU Enlargement |
Literature Review on Supply Chain Contracts -- Relational Contracts -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Quantity Flexibility -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Buy-Back Price -- QF vs. Buy-Back Contract in Buyer-Supplier Relationships -- Case Study: Supplier Relationship Management at Volkswagen Group -- Conclusion and Outlook.
Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contracts is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.
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