Decision-Making in Committees [recurso electrónico] : Game-Theoretic Analysis / by Nicola Friederike Maaser.

Por: Maaser, Nicola Friederike [author.]Colaborador(es): SpringerLink (Online service)Tipo de material: TextoTextoSeries Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 635Editor: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010Descripción: XXII, 126p. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9783642041532Tema(s): Economics | Europe -- Economic policy | Economics, Mathematical | Political science | Economics/Management Science | Game Theory/Mathematical Methods | Political Science | European IntegrationFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 330.0151 | 330 Clasificación LoC:HB144Recursos en línea: Libro electrónicoTexto
Contenidos:
Games and Political Decisions -- Committees as Representative Institutions -- Robust Equal Representation -- Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation.
En: Springer eBooksResumen: Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
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Libro Electrónico Biblioteca Electrónica
Colección de Libros Electrónicos HB144 (Browse shelf(Abre debajo)) 1 No para préstamo 373623-2001

Games and Political Decisions -- Committees as Representative Institutions -- Robust Equal Representation -- Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation.

Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.

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