Strategic Social Choice [recurso electrónico] : Stable Representations of Constitutions / by Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters.
Tipo de material: TextoSeries Studies in Choice and WelfareEditor: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010Descripción: XVIII, 154 p. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9783642138751Tema(s): Economics | Mathematics | Economics, Mathematical | Social sciences -- Methodology | Economics/Management Science | Game Theory/Mathematical Methods | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences | Economic Theory | Methodology of the Social SciencesFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 330.0151 | 330 Clasificación LoC:HB144Recursos en línea: Libro electrónicoTipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
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Libro Electrónico | Biblioteca Electrónica | Colección de Libros Electrónicos | HB144 (Browse shelf(Abre debajo)) | 1 | No para préstamo | 374608-2001 |
Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
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