Oligopoly [recurso electrónico] : Old Ends - New Means / by Tönu Puu.

Por: Puu, Tönu [author.]Colaborador(es): SpringerLink (Online service)Tipo de material: Texto

TextoEditor: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011Descripción: IX, 172 p. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9783642159640Tema(s): Economics | Mathematics | Industrial organization (Economic theory) | Economics/Management Science | Industrial Organization | Applications of MathematicsFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 338.6 Clasificación LoC:HD28-70HD2321-4730.9Recursos en línea: Libro electrónico Texto

Contenidos:

Introduction -- Cournot Oligopoly -- Duopoly and Complex Dynamics -- Stackelberg Leadership -- Capacity Limits -- Multistability -- The Hotelling Paradox.

En: Springer eBooksResumen: The book focuses classical oligopoly theory as developed in 1840-1940. By the end of this period oligopoly came under the spell of game theory in its probabilistic equilibrium format. Work by Cournot, von Stackelberg, Palander, and Hotelling, causal and dynamic in essence, but ignored, is reconsidered in the light of modern dynamics using topology and numerics. As particular features, von Stackelberg leadership is included in the dynamic Cournot model, the Hotelling problem is solved with elastic demand, thus skipping the absurd idea of quadratic transportation costs. Further, it is shown that the celebrated destabilisation of Cournot equilibrium under increased competition is due to mistakenly assuming constant returns, and that the whole idea of rational expectations is untenable in dynamic oligopoly. Early original ideas in oligopoly theory, such as coexistence and multiplicity of attractors are focused again after many undeserved decades of oblivion.

Existencias ( 1 )
Notas de título ( 3 )

Existencias
Tipo de ítem	Biblioteca actual	Colección	Signatura	Copia número	Estado	Fecha de vencimiento	Código de barras
Libro Electrónico	Biblioteca Electrónica	Colección de Libros Electrónicos	HD28 -70 (Browse shelf(Abre debajo))	1	No para préstamo		375184-2001

Introduction -- Cournot Oligopoly -- Duopoly and Complex Dynamics -- Stackelberg Leadership -- Capacity Limits -- Multistability -- The Hotelling Paradox.

The book focuses classical oligopoly theory as developed in 1840-1940. By the end of this period oligopoly came under the spell of game theory in its probabilistic equilibrium format. Work by Cournot, von Stackelberg, Palander, and Hotelling, causal and dynamic in essence, but ignored, is reconsidered in the light of modern dynamics using topology and numerics. As particular features, von Stackelberg leadership is included in the dynamic Cournot model, the Hotelling problem is solved with elastic demand, thus skipping the absurd idea of quadratic transportation costs. Further, it is shown that the celebrated destabilisation of Cournot equilibrium under increased competition is due to mistakenly assuming constant returns, and that the whole idea of rational expectations is untenable in dynamic oligopoly. Early original ideas in oligopoly theory, such as coexistence and multiplicity of attractors are focused again after many undeserved decades of oblivion.