The Political Economy of Collective Decision-Making [recurso electrónico] : Conflicts and Coalitions in the Council of the European Union / by Tim Veen.
Tipo de material: TextoEditor: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011Descripción: XVIII, 199 p. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9783642201745Tema(s): Social sciences | Europe -- Economic policy | Economics, Mathematical | Social sciences -- Methodology | Political science | Social Sciences | Political Science | European Integration | Methodology of the Social Sciences | Game Theory/Mathematical MethodsFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 320 Clasificación LoC:JA1-92Recursos en línea: Libro electrónicoTipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
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Libro Electrónico | Biblioteca Electrónica | Colección de Libros Electrónicos | JA1 -92 (Browse shelf(Abre debajo)) | 1 | No para préstamo | 376025-2001 |
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Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Analysing Council Decision-Making -- 3 Power, Position and Salience -- 4 Dimensionality and Nature of Conflict -- 5 Coalitions in the Council -- 6 Winners and Losers of Decision-Making -- 7 The Council: Conflict and Coalitions -- References.
The Council of the European Union is the institutional heart of EU policy-making. But ‘who gets what, when and how’ in the Council? What are the dimensions of political conflict, and which countries form coalitions in the intense negotiations to achieve their desired policy outcomes? Focussing on collective decision-making in the Council between 1998 and 2007, this book provides a comprehensive account of these salient issues that lie at the heart of political accountability and legitimacy in the European Union. Based on a novel and unique dataset of estimates of government policy positions, salience and power in influencing deliberations, an explanatory model approximating the Nash-Bargaining solution is employed to predict the policy outcomes on ten policy domains of central importance to this institution. The book's analyses comprise investigations into the determinants of decision-making success, the architecture of the political space and the governments' coalition behavior.
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