Modeling Attack Security of Physical Unclonable Functions based on Arbiter PUFs [electronic resource] / by Nils Wisiol.

Por: Wisiol, Nils [author.]Colaborador(es): SpringerLink (Online service)Tipo de material: TextoTextoSeries T-Labs Series in Telecommunication ServicesEditor: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2023Edición: 1st ed. 2023Descripción: XI, 118 p. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9783031292071Tema(s): Signal processing | Electronic circuits | Security systems | Signal, Speech and Image Processing | Electronic Circuits and Systems | Security Science and TechnologyFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin título; Printed edition:: Sin título; Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 621.382 Clasificación LoC:TK5102.9Recursos en línea: Libro electrónicoTexto
Contenidos:
Introduction -- Physical Unclonable Functions -- XOR Arbiter PUFs -- XOR Arbiter PUFs with Input Transformation -- Interpose PUF -- Feed-Forward Arbiter PUF -- Beli PUF -- LP-PUF -- pypuf: Python Software Library for PUF Research -- Conclusion.
En: Springer Nature eBookResumen: This book studies the security of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based on the Arbiter PUF design, with a focus on so-called modeling attacks. The author shows the insecurity of several designs and proposes a novel construction that is proven to be immune against attacks known in scientific literature. The book explores designs of variants and compositions of the Arbiter PUF, which was introduced as a CMOS-compatible, electrical PUF design, and has received a lot of research attention, albeit being insecure with respect to modeling attacks. After revisiting modeling attacks on the Arbiter PUF and XOR Arbiter PUF, the author demonstrates attacks against the Lightweight Secure XOR Arbiter PUF, Feed-Forward Arbiter PUF, and the Interpose PUF. He then introduces two novel PUF designs, the Beli PUF and the LP-PUF, and analyzes their security against modeling attacks. The book concludes by showing how the LP-PUF is resilient against currently known modeling attacks.
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Acceso multiusuario

Introduction -- Physical Unclonable Functions -- XOR Arbiter PUFs -- XOR Arbiter PUFs with Input Transformation -- Interpose PUF -- Feed-Forward Arbiter PUF -- Beli PUF -- LP-PUF -- pypuf: Python Software Library for PUF Research -- Conclusion.

This book studies the security of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based on the Arbiter PUF design, with a focus on so-called modeling attacks. The author shows the insecurity of several designs and proposes a novel construction that is proven to be immune against attacks known in scientific literature. The book explores designs of variants and compositions of the Arbiter PUF, which was introduced as a CMOS-compatible, electrical PUF design, and has received a lot of research attention, albeit being insecure with respect to modeling attacks. After revisiting modeling attacks on the Arbiter PUF and XOR Arbiter PUF, the author demonstrates attacks against the Lightweight Secure XOR Arbiter PUF, Feed-Forward Arbiter PUF, and the Interpose PUF. He then introduces two novel PUF designs, the Beli PUF and the LP-PUF, and analyzes their security against modeling attacks. The book concludes by showing how the LP-PUF is resilient against currently known modeling attacks.

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