TY  - BOOK
AU  - Peleg,Bezalel
AU  - Peters,Hans
ED  - SpringerLink (Online service)
TI  - Strategic Social Choice: Stable Representations of Constitutions 
T2  - Studies in Choice and Welfare,
SN  - 9783642138751
AV  - HB144 
U1  - 330.0151 23
PY  - 2010///
CY  - Berlin, Heidelberg
PB  - Springer Berlin Heidelberg
KW  - Economics
KW  - Mathematics
KW  - Economics, Mathematical
KW  - Social sciences
KW  - Methodology
KW  - Economics/Management Science
KW  - Game Theory/Mathematical Methods
KW  - Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
KW  - Economic Theory
KW  - Methodology of the Social Sciences
N1  - Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
N2  - This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution
UR  - http://148.231.10.114:2048/login?url=http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1
ER  -