TY  - BOOK
AU  - Gong,Guang
AU  - Gupta,Kishan Chand
ED  - SpringerLink (Online service)
TI  - Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2010: 11th International Conference on Cryptology in India, Hyderabad, India, December 12-15, 2010. Proceedings 
T2  - Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
SN  - 9783642174018
AV  - QA76.9.A25 
U1  - 005.82 23
PY  - 2010///
CY  - Berlin, Heidelberg
PB  - Springer Berlin Heidelberg
KW  - Computer science
KW  - Computer Communication Networks
KW  - Data protection
KW  - Data encryption (Computer science)
KW  - Computer software
KW  - Computational complexity
KW  - Information Systems
KW  - Computer Science
KW  - Data Encryption
KW  - Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
KW  - Management of Computing and Information Systems
KW  - Systems and Data Security
KW  - Discrete Mathematics in Computer Science
N1  - Invited Talk -- Getting a Few Things Right and Many Things Wrong -- Security of RSA and Multivariate Schemes -- Partial Key Exposure Attack on RSA – Improvements for Limited Lattice Dimensions -- Towards Provable Security of the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Signature Scheme under Direct Attacks -- CyclicRainbow – A Multivariate Signature Scheme with a Partially Cyclic Public Key -- Security Analysis, Pseudorandom Permutations and Applications -- Combined Security Analysis of the One- and Three-Pass Unified Model Key Agreement Protocols -- Indifferentiability beyond the Birthday Bound for the Xor of Two Public Random Permutations -- The Characterization of Luby-Rackoff and Its Optimum Single-Key Variants -- Versatile Prêt à Voter: Handling Multiple Election Methods with a Unified Interface -- Invited Talk -- Cryptographic Hash Functions: Theory and Practice -- Hash Functions -- Cryptanalysis of Tav-128 Hash Function -- Near-Collisions for the Reduced Round Versions of Some Second Round SHA-3 Compression Functions Using Hill Climbing -- Speeding Up the Wide-Pipe: Secure and Fast Hashing -- Attacks on Block Ciphers and Stream Ciphers -- New Boomerang Attacks on ARIA -- Algebraic, AIDA/Cube and Side Channel Analysis of KATAN Family of Block Ciphers -- The Improbable Differential Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round CLEFIA -- Greedy Distinguishers and Nonrandomness Detectors -- Fast Cryptographic Computation -- Polynomial Multiplication over Binary Fields Using Charlier Polynomial Representation with Low Space Complexity -- Random Euclidean Addition Chain Generation and Its Application to Point Multiplication -- Cryptanalysis of AES -- Attack on a Higher-Order Masking of the AES Based on Homographic Functions -- Improved Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of 7-Round AES-128 -- Cryptanalysis of a Perturbated White-Box AES Implementation -- Efficient Implementation -- A Program Generator for Intel AES-NI Instructions -- ECC2K-130 on NVIDIA GPUs -- One Byte per Clock: A Novel RC4 Hardware
N2  - Strong Pseudorandompermutations or SPRPs,which were introduced byLuby andRacko? [4], formalize the well established cryptographic notion ofblock ciphers.They provided a construction of SPRP, well known as LRconstruction, which was motivated by the structure of DES[6].The basicbuildingblock is the so called 2n-bit Feistel permutation (or LR round permutation) LR based F K on an n-bitpseudorandomfunction (PRF) F : K n LR (x ,x)=(F (x )?x ,x ),x ,x?{0,1} . F 1 2 K 1 2 1 1 2 K Theirconstruction consists (see Fig 1) offour rounds of Feistel permutations (or three rounds, for PRP), each round involves an application ofanindependent PRF(i.e.with independentrandomkeys K ,K ,K , and K ). More precisely, 1 2 3 4 LR and LR are PRP and SPRP respectively where K ,K ,K K ,K ,K ,K 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 LR := LR := LR (...(LR (·))...). K ,...,K F ,...,F F F 1 r K K K K r r 1 1 After this work, many results are known improvingperformance (reducingthe number of invocations of F )[5] and reducingthekey-sizes (i.e. reusingthe K roundkeys [7,8,10,12,11] orgenerate more keysfromsinglekey by usinga PRF[2]). However there are some limitations.Forexample,wecannotuseas few as single-keyLR (unless wetweak the roundpermutation) orasfew as two-roundsince they are not secure.Distinguishing attacks forsome other LR constructionsarealso known [8]. We list some oftheknow related results (see Table 1). Here all keys K ,K ,... are independently chosen
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