An Economic Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties [recurso electrónico] / by Jan Peter Sasse.
Tipo de material: TextoEditor: Wiesbaden : Gabler, 2011Descripción: XXIII, 239 p. online resourceTipo de contenido: text Tipo de medio: computer Tipo de portador: online resourceISBN: 9783834961853Tema(s): Economics | Economics/Management Science | Economics generalFormatos físicos adicionales: Printed edition:: Sin títuloClasificación CDD: 330 Clasificación LoC:HB71-74Recursos en línea: Libro electrónico En: Springer eBooksResumen: Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are an important instrument for the protection of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, compared to international trade law, international investment law has so far received only little research attention from an economic point of view. By applying a law and economics approach, Jan Peter Sasse provides a systematic analysis of the way BITs function. He explains why BITs are more than just a signal, how they relate to institutional competition as well as to institutional quality and why transparency in international investment arbitration is hard to achieve and may even be detrimental.Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Libro Electrónico | Biblioteca Electrónica | Colección de Libros Electrónicos | HB71 -74 (Browse shelf(Abre debajo)) | 1 | No para préstamo | 377122-2001 |
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are an important instrument for the protection of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, compared to international trade law, international investment law has so far received only little research attention from an economic point of view. By applying a law and economics approach, Jan Peter Sasse provides a systematic analysis of the way BITs function. He explains why BITs are more than just a signal, how they relate to institutional competition as well as to institutional quality and why transparency in international investment arbitration is hard to achieve and may even be detrimental.
19