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001			u373504
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007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			101112s2011 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783642031076 _9978-3-642-03107-6
040			_cMX-MeUAM
050		4	_aHB1-846.8
082	0	4	_a330.1 _223
100	1		_aGehrlein, William V. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aVoting Paradoxes and Group Coherence _h[recurso electrónico] : _bThe Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules / _cby William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley.
264		1	_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg : _bImprint: Springer, _c2011.
300			_aXII, 385 p. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aStudies in Choice and Welfare, _x1614-0311
505	0		_aVoting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities -- Condorcet's Paradox and Group Coherence -- Other Incompability Paradoxes -- Other Voting Paradoxes -- Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity -- Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis -- Other Characteristics of Voting Rules -- The Significance of Voting Rule Selection -- Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies.
520			_aThe likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters’ preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters’ preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters’ preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.
650		0	_aEconomics.
650		0	_aMathematics.
650		0	_aFinance.
650		0	_aEconomics, Mathematical.
650	1	4	_aEconomics/Management Science.
650	2	4	_aEconomic Theory.
650	2	4	_aGame Theory/Mathematical Methods.
650	2	4	_aPublic Finance & Economics.
650	2	4	_aPolitical Science, general.
650	2	4	_aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
700	1		_aLepelley, Dominique. _eauthor.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783642031069
830		0	_aStudies in Choice and Welfare, _x1614-0311
856	4	0	_zLibro electrónico _uhttp://148.231.10.114:2048/login?url=http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6
596			_a19
942			_cLIBRO_ELEC
999			_c201384 _d201384