000			03876nam a22004815i 4500
001			u377307
003			SIRSI
005			20160812084456.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			100906s2010 it | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9788847015876 _9978-88-470-1587-6
040			_cMX-MeUAM
050		4	_aQP351-495
050		4	_aQP360-360.7
082	0	4	_a612.8 _223
100	1		_aMichela, Balconi. _eeditor.
245	1	0	_aNeuropsychology of the Sense of Agency _h[recurso electrónico] : _bFrom Consciousness to Action / _cedited by Balconi Michela.
264		1	_aMilano : _bSpringer Milan, _c2010.
300			_aXV, 192 p. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0		_aCognition, Consciousness and Agency -- The Sense of Agency in Psychology and Neuropsychology -- Affordances and the Sense of Joint Agency -- Brain, Agency and Self-agency: Neuropsychological Contributions to the Development of the Sense of Agency -- The Neuropsychology of Senses of Agency: Theoretical and Empirical Contributions -- Functional Anatomy of the Sense of Agency: Past Evidence and Future Driections -- The Monitoring of Experience and Agency in Daily Life: A Study with Italian Adolescents -- Agency and Inter-agency, Action and Joint Action: Theoretical and Neuropsychological Evidence -- Clinical Aspects Associated with Disruption of the Sense of Agency -- Disruption of the Sense of Agency: From Perception to Self-knowldge -- Disturbances of the Sense of Agency in Schizophrenia -- Looking for Outcomes: The Experience of Control and Sense of Agency in Obsessive-compulsive Behaviors -- Body and Self-awareness: Functional and Dysfunctional Mechanisms.
520			_aThe complex issues of agency and self-agency have been examined by researchers in the related fields of psychology and neuropsychology. This volume approaches the cognitive and neuropsychological correlates as two sides of the same coin, with the aim of establishing a correspondence between the hardware (cerebral processes) and software (cognitive processes) of the representation of agency. All living systems self-regulate, and within any living system - whether it is as small as a cell or a complete plant or animal - there must be communication between its many parts. In addition, a prerequisite for organisms to act is an ability to distinguish between self and other. In humans, this ability may be either learned or comprise an inherent part of the process of action. The predominant account explaining the sense of agency of our own actions is the “central monitoring theory” or “comparator model” which postulates the monitoring of central and peripheral signals arising as a consequence of the execution of an action. Alternative perspectives include simulation theory. These models, as well as the contribution of body representation for agency, are explored here, taking into account the significance of proprioceptive feedback for self-agent attribution. Finally, the neural correlates of action and agent representation are discussed in the context of recent empirical results.
650		0	_aPhilosophy (General).
650		0	_aNeurosciences.
650		0	_aPsychiatry.
650		0	_aPsychology, clinical.
650		0	_aConsciousness.
650	1	4	_aPsychology.
650	2	4	_aNeuropsychology.
650	2	4	_aNeurosciences.
650	2	4	_aCognitive Psychology.
650	2	4	_aPsychiatry.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9788847015869
856	4	0	_zLibro electrónico _uhttp://148.231.10.114:2048/login?url=http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-88-470-1587-6
596			_a19
942			_cLIBRO_ELEC
999			_c205187 _d205187