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020 _a9789048185375
_9978-90-481-8537-5
040 _cMX-MeUAM
050 4 _aBJ1-1725
082 0 4 _a170
_223
100 1 _aDiSilvestro, Russell.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aHuman Capacities and Moral Status
_h[recurso electrónico] /
_cby Russell DiSilvestro.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2010.
300 _aXIV, 208p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aPhilosophy and Medicine,
_x0376-7418 ;
_v108
505 0 _aYou Are Not What You Think: Capacities, Human Organisms, and Persons -- Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Also: Humans, Our Capacities, and the Powers We Share -- The Only Game in Town: Why Capacities Must Matter Morally -- Little People: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Potential -- Not Just Damaged Goods: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Marginal Cases -- Old Objections and New Directions: Capacities and Moral Status at the Very Borders of Human Life.
520 _aMany debates about the moral status of things—for example, debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman animals—eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities of the things in question—for example, their capacities to feel pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capacities is often controversial: if a human’s capacities are the basis of its moral status, how could a human having lesser capacities than you and I have the same "serious" moral status as you and I? This book answers this question by arguing that if something is human, it has a set of typical human capacities; that if something has a set of typical human capacities, it has serious moral status; and thus all human beings have the same sort of serious moral status as you and I. Beginning from what our common intuitions tell us about situations involving "temporary incapacitation"—where a human organism has, then loses, then regains a certain capacity—this book argues for substantive conclusions regarding human fetuses and embryos, humans in a permanent vegetative state, humans suffering from brain diseases, and humans born with genetic disorders. Since these conclusions must have some impact on our ongoing moral and political debates about the proper treatment of such humans, this book will be useful to professionals and students in philosophy, bioethics, law, medicine, and public policy.
650 0 _aPhilosophy (General).
650 0 _aEthics.
650 0 _amedicine
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 _aPublic health.
650 0 _aMedical ethics.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aEthics.
650 2 4 _aTheory of Medicine/Bioethics.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Medicine.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Mind.
650 2 4 _aPublic Health.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789048185368
830 0 _aPhilosophy and Medicine,
_x0376-7418 ;
_v108
856 4 0 _zLibro electrónico
_uhttp://148.231.10.114:2048/login?url=http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-90-481-8537-5
596 _a19
942 _cLIBRO_ELEC
999 _c205643
_d205643